

# GLOBAL BRITAIN: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY VISION

BY BOB SEELY MP AND JAMES ROGERS



DEMOCRACY | FREEDOM | HUMAN RIGHTS

**GLOBAL  
BRITAIN  
PROGRAMME**

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## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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**Bob Seely** is the Member of Parliament for the Isle of Wight. He sits on the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee and is a Parliamentary Private Secretary. Mr Seely has written academically and journalistically on strategic doctrine and foreign affairs as well as more generally on non-conventional and new forms of conflict. He has also been a research associate at the Changing Character of War Programme at the University of Oxford. In 2018, Mr Seely wrote one of the few peer-reviewed definitions of Contemporary Russian Conflict Strategy available in the West. Prior to his election in June 2017, Mr Seely served on the Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and ISIS campaigns as a member of the Armed Forces. He was awarded a Joint Commanders Commendation in 2009 and a Military MBE in the 2016 Operational Awards and Honours List. From 1990 to 1994, Mr Seely lived in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet states, working as a foreign correspondent for *The Times* and as a special correspondent for *The Washington Post*. He tweets at: @iowbobseely, is on Instagram: @BobSeelyMP, and is on Facebook at: loWBobSeely. His web address is: <https://www.bobseely.org.uk>. His academic and foreign affairs writing is available online at: <https://kcl.academia.edu/RobertSeely>.

**James Rogers** is Director of the Global Britain Programme at the Henry Jackson Society, of which he is a founding member. From 2012 to 2017 he held a range of positions at the Baltic Defence College in Estonia, including acting Dean, Director of the Department of Political and Strategic Studies, and Lecturer in strategic studies. He has been an associate Fellow (2013) and Visiting Fellow (2008) at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris. He has also worked on projects for a range of organisations, including the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, RAND Europe, the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute for International Relations (Egmont). He has given evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Houses of Parliament, as well as the Subcommittee on Security and Defence at the European Parliament. He holds a first-class BSc Econ (hons) in International Politics and Strategic Studies from Aberystwyth University and an MPhil in Contemporary European Studies from the University of Cambridge.

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## FOREWORD - DR ALAN MENDOZA

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I am delighted to launch this report as part of a long-running series of papers by the Global Britain Programme at the Henry Jackson Society. While this programme does not pretend to have any monopoly on wisdom over the meaning and path of “Global Britain”, it hopes to educate the public on some of the possibilities that lay ahead for the United Kingdom as it embarks on a new national project of change and renewal.

*Global Britain: A Twenty-First Century Vision* – co-authored by Bob Seely MP and James Rogers – is the Henry Jackson Society’s latest offering. It presents a range of possibilities the United Kingdom could undertake to make the institutions and the instruments – military and diplomatic – of British state power more effective, particularly as the world enters a new age of flux and competition. As such, it is designed to provoke further discussion over the concept and realisation of “Global Britain”.

The vision Mr Seely and Mr Rogers provide in this report is of course their own, rather than a corporate one of the Henry Jackson Society. It has been extensively peer-reviewed and we hope it will start a conversation at the national level, and will lead to an educational ripple effect as the ideas contained within are debated vigorously in the months and years to come. As part of that process, we will be publishing other contributions on aspects of “Global Britain” to reflect other views about our nation’s possible trajectory.

Any comments in relation to this paper will of course be most welcome; indeed, I consider them – positive or otherwise – to form part of this crucial national debate. Readers are welcome to submit them to me at [global.britain@henryjacksonsociety.org](mailto:global.britain@henryjacksonsociety.org).

**- Dr Alan Mendoza**

Executive Director, The Henry Jackson Society

## **FOREWORD - THE RT. HON. BORIS JOHNSON MP**

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It was only a few weeks after the Russian state attempted to murder Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury that Putin received a response that I don't believe he had for a minute expected. A total of 28 countries expelled 153 Russian spies - not just in protest at the use of chemical weapons in Wiltshire, but also out of sympathy for the UK. There has been nothing like it in recent diplomatic history. Each expulsion represented a considerable diplomatic cost for the country concerned; and the mere fact that those countries were prepared to bear that cost, and incur inevitable Russian retaliation, was a tribute to the enormous influence of the UK.

As Bob Seely MP and James Rogers rightly argue in this timely pamphlet, we often underestimate that influence. It is curious, they say, that senior mandarins self-deprecatingly referring to the UK as a "middle-ranking power", when according to some estimates this country's combination of military, political, cultural, financial, diplomatic, humanitarian and other capabilities mean that its global reach and influence is second only to the United States.

Now is the time - as we leave the EU - to turbo-charge those advantages. It is time to join so many of our friends around the world in believing in a truly Global Britain - a project that is totally consistent with this country's history and instincts.

The authors identify three great campaigns for Global Britain - free trade, freedom from oppression, and freedom of thought - and it is hard to disagree. They make some keen observations about the change in the threats that this country faces, notably the growth in new subversive techniques, especially in Russia (a specialism of Bob Seely). They outline some of the opportunities we could seize, with some creative thinking about improving our already strong relations with the "Anglosphere". They make the important distinction between countries with whom we share values, and countries with whom we share interests, and note that they two groups are by no means congruent.

The authors are to be applauded for some radical thinking about reform of Whitehall, so as to make far better use of our overall overseas spending, and to ensure that these vast sums do more to serve the political and commercial interests of the country.

This is an original and important contribution to the debate, and will give food for thought - and encouragement - to all who believe in a Global Britain.

**- The Rt. Hon. Boris Johnson MP**

Member of Parliament for Uxbridge and South Ruislip  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2016-2018

## FOREWORD - IAN AUSTIN MP

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The Henry Jackson Society does important and valuable work in challenging politicians and policy makers and educating the public on the need for a principled foreign policy that puts the spread of freedom and democracy around the world at its heart.

It is for this reason that I am pleased to recommend this report – *Global Britain: A Twenty-First Century Vision* – as a contribution to the society’s mission.

Given the rise of revisionist and authoritarian states, it is particularly important to have a debate about how Britain might engage in developing a comprehensive national strategy to engage successfully in a more volatile and competitive international environment.

With their “Three Freedoms”, Bob Seely and James Rogers provide a plethora of ideas as to how the United Kingdom might be able to maximise its potential in the world over the years ahead. Their arguments are bold and insightful, and deserve to provoke discussion about the future of “Global Britain”.

I was a proud supporter of the Labour government’s decision to create a Department for International Development in 1997, increase overseas aid, write off debt and tackle poverty as Britain led the international campaign for justice for the world’s poorest people. So while I would personally caution about merging DfID back into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as the report suggests might be possible, or to radically redefine what constitutes development assistance, given that others have recognised our criteria as the international gold standard, I am also clear that the purpose of a report like this is not for the reader – or even an endorser like me – to agree with every single idea within it.

Whether or not you are convinced by all of its arguments, this report is designed to spark a national debate about our collective future. As such, it certainly raises serious questions that Westminster and Whitehall cannot leave unanswered.

**- Ian Austin MP**

Member of Parliament for Dudley North  
Member, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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- Global Britain implies a National Global Strategy to express the nation's values and interests beyond our shores. Whilst the United Kingdom (UK) has moved towards a more integrated approach to foreign policy in recent months, it still arguably lacks such a strategy. It should have one. This document is a contribution to that debate.
- Whilst conventional wars are in decline and much of humanity enjoys more enriched lives than before, the world has become a more challenging place now than at the end of the twentieth century. New forms of integrated conflict and competition are being developed by rivals and potential adversaries. The international rules-based system is under threat from authoritarian states that wish to change it (China) or undermine it (Russia). The battle for the twenty-first century is, in part, a struggle between open and closed societies that will shape the future of humanity.

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

### Strategy

1. **Three Global Campaigns:** The UK should base its global strategy on championing three great, worldwide campaigns:
  1. Freedom for Trade
  2. Freedom from Oppression
  3. Freedom of Thought
2. **National Strategy Council:** Britain should establish a National Strategy Council to develop a global grand strategy and drive cross-government integration. This new National *Strategy* Council should evolve out of the existing National *Security* Council.
3. **National Global Strategy:** Every decade, the new National Strategy Council should lead a National Global Strategy Review. This should be needs-driven, not cost-driven, and encompass future Strategic Defence and Security Reviews.
4. **Overseas Spending Audit:** The government should conduct an Overseas Spending Audit to ascertain its total spending on global engagement.

### Structure

5. **Integration:** To support the government's drive for integrated working across departments to deliver its global strategy, the Department for International Development (DfID) and Department for International Trade (DIT) should be amalgamated into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as new agencies, similar to the model used in Australia and Canada.
6. **Joint Effects Teams (JETs):** Integration should take place at all levels. At embassy and regional level, integrated working through Joint Effects Teams (JETs) should be the institutionalised norm.
7. **Integrated Line Management:** UK ambassadors and High Commissioners should have line management of *all* staff, regardless of department, and be responsible for developing integrated plans with departmental and agency stakeholders.

8. **Single Legal Chain:** Within teams, there should be a single legal chain to speed decision-making, to prevent operations moving at the pace of the most risk averse government lawyers.
9. **A common set of pay and conditions:** Such conditions should be implemented for overseas posts to prevent the iniquity of diplomats and civil servants doing similar jobs for different rates of pay.
10. **A Diaspora Global Advisory Council:** The FCO should establish a Diaspora Global Advisory Council to empower diaspora communities in the UK to support and deepen Britain's relationships with nations throughout the world.

## Spending

11. **British Broadcasting Corporation:** The BBC World Service should be mandated by the FCO to become the global broadcast of integrity on *all* major audio and visual platforms. It should be funded primarily from the "international development" budget and that funding assured to enable long-term investment. Funding should be earmarked at up to £1 billion per annum.
12. **UK Peacekeeping:** All UK peacekeeping should be funded through overseas aid, with savings in the MoD budget used to increase the UK's military capability.
13. **International Development Redefined:** Whilst humanitarian aid spending should be preserved, changes should be made to the definition of "international development" to allow more spending to be channelled through the FCO and Ministry of Defence (MoD). In addition, other reforms should be put in place to ensure improved quality of aid expenditure and value for money.
14. **Targets Realigned:** The UK spends 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on official development assistance (ODA), and then more on other overseas projects to promote "international development". The UK should cap the total amount of spending on "international development" – inclusive of ODA – at 0.7%. ultimately, this target should remain only provided the UK gains the freedom to define aid as it sees fit.
15. **UK International Development Fund:** The 0.7% GNI target should not be mandatory but would depend on the quality of the projects. Unallocated funding should be put into a UK Development Fund until projects are fully formulated and/or to fund projects in following years.
16. **Military and Space Programmes:** The UK should not provide oda to countries with advanced military or space programmes unless there is a clear strategic purpose. In general, states with such programmes should be ineligible for UK assistance.
17. **Hard power uplift:** As part of a more general rebalancing of British global spending, the UK should spend more on military power if its armed forces are to deploy in a meaningful way alongside those of the United States (US), as well as lead in the strategic defence of Europe and support CANZUK – Australia, Canada and New Zealand – and other allies globally. Given that the international environment is becoming more dangerous, the UK should bring spending gradually and efficiently to historically "normal" levels, i.e. 2.5% to 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

- 18. The “Anglosphere” and CANZUK:** The UK should deepen ties with Canada, New Zealand and Australia in a new CANZUK alliance covering trade, defence, academia and research, and visa and travel agreements.
- 19. Multilateralism:** As part of the UK’s commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based order, Britain should make a renewed investment in the united nations with greater support for its peacekeeping operations and key campaigns linked to the Three Freedoms, such as rule of law. The UK should also seek to champion a new round of free trade talks.
- 20. National Resilience:** Promoting the Three Freedoms abroad also means ensuring their protection at home. Britain should make its electoral system and governance more resilient to foreign influence.

## 1. GLOBAL BRITAIN AND “GRAND STRATEGY”

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What is “Global Britain”? Although the term was invoked during the 2016 European Union (EU) Referendum campaign, Prime Minister Theresa May was the first to use it in a formal capacity in October 2016 to describe the United Kingdom (UK), post Brexit.<sup>1</sup> Boris Johnson, the then Foreign Secretary, expanded on it in a Chatham House speech on 2 December 2016. In his words:

I have been repeatedly impressed by the way people around the world are looking for a lead from Britain, engagement from Britain. And so whether we like it or not we are not some bit part or spear carrier on the world stage. We are a protagonist – a global Britain running a truly global foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

However, progress on the substance of Global Britain has been slow and it has yet to develop into a national strategy. As the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee dryly commented in a recent report:

The most frequent complaint we have heard ... is that the only thing that is clear about Global Britain is that it is unclear what it means, what it stands for or how its success should be measured.<sup>3</sup>

For example, does Britain have what the great twentieth century strategist Basil Liddell-Hart has called a “grand strategy” – the combination of the great tools of state power? The answer is no. We know this because Sir Simon MacDonald, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Head of the Diplomatic Service, pledged to the Foreign Affairs Committee to produce “something” in early 2019.<sup>4</sup> The UK *does* have a National Security Strategy and a National Security and Defence Review, set in 2015, as well as a National Security Capability Review (2017) and a Modernising Defence Programme (2018). However, as their names imply, they are defence and security focused and deal largely with threats.<sup>5</sup>

Brexit requires a renewed and integrated commitment to global engagement if the UK and its citizens are to continue to play a prominent international role. Brexit should not imply shrinking from the world but rather embracing it. Indeed, although the FCO has created 250 new posts and several new embassies and high commissions overseas,<sup>6</sup> British leaders should think harder about how to use UK influence, not only to offset the loss of EU membership but also to assert the nation’s identity, values and interests in a competitive world. Britain is almost unique in being a member or signatory of 80 global organisations and treaties. Despite the likelihood it will leave two of these, the EU and European Atomic Energy Community, the UK remains one of the world’s pre-eminent proponents of multilateralism and the rules-based international system.

Therefore, to answer the question *What is Global Britain?* the government should produce a “grand strategy” for the nation: what the UK stands for, what its critical interests are, how it sees the world, how it uses its resources, how diplomacy works in the age of social media, and how Britain can protect itself in a changing world.<sup>7</sup>

*Global Britain: A Twenty-First Century Vision* is a contribution to this important debate.

## 2. GLOBAL BRITAIN AND THE “THREE FREEDOMS”

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The UK has been at its strongest when it has upheld a consistent, values-led foreign policy. We propose that the UK champions three fundamental freedoms. The purpose of these freedoms is to set an agenda for Britain, to prioritise its overseas work, and to show leadership in areas where it can do so for the benefit of the British people and humanity. These campaigns also define the UK against potential adversaries in the global competition for ideas and values.

- **Freedom for Trade:** The UK should build on its free trade traditions to become the global champion of a reformed World Trade Organisation (WTO). The United States (US) has, temporarily at least, abdicated that role. In their own respective ways, neither the EU and China are natural “free traders”: the former veers towards protectionism while the latter is increasingly mercantilist, in the sense that it sees trade as a means of national aggrandisement and exerting power. Of the major powers, the UK is uniquely placed to campaign for change, as it seeks to find terms acceptable to the US, the EU, China and other major trading nations. This campaign is serendipitously timed, as the UK will be seeking free trade agreements throughout the world as it leaves the EU. This gives Britain the chance to deepen its international relationships, building up a network of free trading nations through the world, in what the current Foreign Secretary has described as “an invisible chain linking together the democracies of the world, those countries which share our values and support our belief in free trade, the rule of law and open societies.”<sup>8</sup>
- **Freedom from Oppression:** Following the UK’s Anti-Slavery Bill, Britain should continue its role as the global champion opposing modern slavery and indentured labour, and by association as a champion of fundamental human rights. The purpose of this campaign is not to be an exercise in virtue signalling but rather an exemplar of dignity and equality between races, religions and genders. The UK should become a beacon of integrity and decency to which people look, not only to increase its influence and spread its values, but to make the country the most attractive destination for those people – women as well as men – to bring their skills and energy should their own nations not value them.
- **Freedom of Thought:** Freedom of Thought – vital to open, tolerant and creative societies – is our first line of defence against authoritarianism. The UK should become the *global* champion of free thought – and expression – via a renewed and reinvigorated BBC World Service, on all platforms. The BBC World Service should be tasked with becoming the global broadcaster of integrity, continuing to set a benchmark standard in radio and establishing one in television and visual broadcast to counter the broadcasters from authoritarian states. Funding for the BBC World Service should primarily be included in a new definition of “international development” and significantly increased. Funding should be earmarked at up to £1 billion per annum.

These campaigns are important not only to Britain but also to the world. As humanity moves away from lives of scarcity to lives of consumption, new ways of living must be found: with each other, and with the planet. This is especially the case with Artificial Intelligence, the consequences of which few policy-makers, universities, think tanks, commentators or governments have yet begun to consider. Therefore, by championing Freedom for Trade, Freedom from Oppression and Freedom of Thought, the UK not only gives expression to its values, especially in contrast to authoritarian states, but it also sets an example in giving humanity the space to solve some of the critical problems it faces, be they climate change or

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migration flows. Freedom enables all of us, in the broadest sense, to be ambassadors for our values and our nation and to collectively help shape our future.

These Three Freedoms are our national statement to the world. The UK has arguably had a values-led foreign policy – often described as an “ethical” foreign policy during the late 1990s – since the sixteenth century. These values are woven into the national fabric and are part of British history.

For example, Adam Smith’s masterpiece, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) articulated the case for free trade. *The Magna Carta*, signed at Runnymede in 1215, began the process of limiting the arbitrary power of the monarch. The work of a succession of liberal theorists, from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, established the intellectual basis for an open political culture, which helped to support the UK’s scientific and industrial revolutions.

The Somerset Case in 1772 reconfirmed that slavery was illegal in Britain. In 1807, the UK abolished the colonial slave trade. Between 1808 and 1860 the West Africa Squadron – which accounted for one-third of the Royal Navy’s assets – suppressed the slave trade internationally, seizing over 1,600 slave ships and freeing 150,000 slaves.<sup>9</sup>

With the Act of Supremacy during the Elizabethan era, and the later Glorious Revolution – resulting in the Bill of Rights, Declaration of Right and Toleration Act in 1688 – the UK emerged as one of the world’s first recognisably “modern” nations, developing constitutional, parliamentary government. In the UK, suffrage was gradually extended with the Great Reform Act of 1832, while the Municipal Franchise Act of 1869 began to extend it to all sexes.

In the middle and latter half of the twentieth century, the UK led alliances to defeat or deter totalitarian states with illiberal ideologies based on either racial purity (Nazi Germany) or class purity (the Soviet Union).<sup>10</sup> After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the UK, with the US and others, helped establish a new international order with institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Through NATO, the UK played a leading role in containing the Soviet threat during the Cold War until the Soviet Union collapsed between 1989 and 1991.

British history therefore provides the inspiration for the Three Freedoms – Freedom for Trade, Freedom from Oppression and Freedom of Thought.

Britain has not always lived by the standards that it has set itself, but as national histories go it is, overall, one Britons can be proud of. The UK should be unashamed in defending its values and interests. There is no evidence that molycoddling authoritarian states today achieves a purpose: most likely the opposite. It is a truism that authoritarian states – and indeed all states – respect strong and clear leadership. Betraying the UK’s values and interests, as former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, told the Foreign Affairs Committee, generates contempt and a lack of respect.<sup>11</sup> “It is simply craven”, Lord Patten, the last Governor of Hong Kong, told the Committee.<sup>12</sup> Sadly, there is a strain in British political culture which seeks to damn the UK and its historic interaction with the world. This masochistic and ill-informed reinterpretation of history, a form of self-hatred identified by George Orwell, has been amplified by both the leftist intelligentsia and the isolationist right in recent years.<sup>13</sup> Some have denounced the prospect of Global Britain as a fantasy, little more than “Empire 2.0” or an “imperial relic”. The defeatism from both Left and Right should be rejected. Indeed, the UK is well-placed to benefit from the world it has helped, more than any other country bar the US, to shape.

### 3. AN AUDIT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THE WORLD STAGE

The twenty-first century world is likely to be defined by two superpowers: the US and China. India may, at some stage, join them. A series of major powers will exist alongside them. This will include newer or re-emerging regional powers, such as Brazil and Indonesia; great economic powerhouses, such as Germany and Japan; and established powers, such as France and the UK. Although Britain is not a superpower and has not been since the 1950s, it remains very much a great power. Talk of the UK as a “medium-sized” or “middle-ranking” power is pointlessly self-deprecating.<sup>14</sup> Britain remains richly-endowed with national capabilities.

According to the Henry Jackson Society’s latest “Audit of Geopolitical Capability” – released in January 2019 – which assesses the national capabilities of twenty major powers, the UK is one of the very few genuinely global powers, with reach into every region and continent (see Table 1).<sup>15</sup> It ranks second only to the US, albeit some distance behind, and marginally in front of China.<sup>16</sup> In terms of the three main pillars of its domestic structures – its economy, technology and culture – the UK performs strongly.<sup>17</sup> Britain’s “economic clout” remains substantial.<sup>18</sup> World Bank data shows that the country’s economy remains the fifth largest in terms of nominal Gross National Income (GNI).<sup>19</sup> Credit Suisse’s annual “Global Wealth Report” reveals that the UK – with over US\$14.2 trillion – holds the fifth highest quantity of total net wealth in the world, more than any other European country bar Germany (which holds only marginally more).<sup>20</sup> In terms of “technological prowess”, the country sits behind only the US, China and Japan, while for “cultural prestige” it is exceeded only by the US.<sup>21</sup> The British higher education sector, a critical element in cultural and civilisational soft power, performs remarkably. According to *Times Higher Education*, the UK has more Top 500 universities than any other country bar the US, with almost as many as Germany and France *together*.<sup>22</sup> Even in terms of social progress, the Social Progress Initiative ranks the UK higher than countries such as Australia, Canada and France.<sup>23</sup>

In terms of “national instruments”, the UK has the second largest “diplomatic leverage”, with one of the largest diplomatic networks and “international development” budgets on the planet.<sup>24</sup> In terms of “military might”, the UK is one of the few countries with an expeditionary military capability – the ability to mount operations far from home – with a navy with total displacement

**Table 1: The position of the UK for each attribute and pillar of geopolitical capability**

<b>Geopolitical Capability</b>	<b>Position among the twenty major powers</b>
<b>National Base</b>	<b>8th</b>
<b>National Structure</b>	<b>2nd</b>
Economic Clout	5th
Technological Prowess	4th
Cultural Prestige	2nd
<b>National Instruments</b>	<b>2nd</b>
Diplomatic Leverage	2nd
Military Might	3rd
<b>National Resolve</b>	<b>2nd</b>

tonnage of large warships and auxiliary vessels comparable to France, Germany and Italy *combined*.<sup>25</sup> It also has military bases throughout the world. It opened a new facility in Bahrain last year and plans to establish new facilities in the Caribbean and the Far East in due course.<sup>26</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies places the country sixth for military spending, comparable to India and Russia.<sup>27</sup> In terms of “national resolve” - the efficacy of the government and the percentage of national income the country is prepared to devote to global engagement - the UK is second only to Canada.<sup>28</sup>

## 4. WHAT COULD CHANGE?

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Why, then, is there sometimes a mismatch between the UK's extensive national capabilities and its ability to deliver – consistently – the influence that it would like? To use a card-playing analogy, the UK sometimes plays a good hand badly. Diplomats say privately, amongst other things, that Britain's departments of state could integrate their efforts more; that they spread themselves too thin and that UK spending is unbalanced.

The UK can sometimes lack strategy and purpose.<sup>29</sup> For a country that has so many think tanks devoted to strategy and strategic thinking, it is ironic that the UK can sometimes seem devoid of a national strategy, unless “muddling through” is a governing philosophy or characteristic of its strategic culture. Britain's foreign policy has occasionally become lazy. At the UN, the UK's diplomatic strengths have arguably been under-used in recent years. Globally, Britain has relied progressively on the US to project “hard” power, becoming an increasingly junior and unquestioning partner.<sup>30</sup> The second Iraq War was perhaps the most humiliating example of this trend. The UK has relied on the EU to project some forms of “soft” power, especially in trade policy and immigration. Both alliances have been weakened over the past few years. This should serve as a reminder that the UK needs the ability to act alone sometimes; not because it wishes to do so but because, firstly, it may need to do so, and secondly, by being a strong power which uses its national resources effectively, Britain will find it easier to make and renew alliances.

Under the current laydown, British foreign policy risks being less than the sum of its parts, not only because of a lack of integration, but also because it is divided between so many departments. These include: the FCO, MoD, the Department for International Development (DfID), the Department for International Trade (DIT), the Cabinet Office, 10 Downing Street and, temporarily, the Department for Exiting the EU. The FCO itself has become more limited in its outlook. It is responsible for less. The partial loss of international counter-terrorism to the Home Office was a symbol of the FCO's decline.<sup>31</sup>

Whilst ministers and officials aim to integrate global policy, some diplomats and officials concede that this is not always the case and that at all levels, but especially when coordinated strategies arrive at departmental level, integration can be lost. The UK, they say, also needs to be proactive rather than simply reactive. Reforms to the National Security Council are required, as well as to the FCO and to the ministries that deal with overseas policy. Britain should restructure how it “does” foreign policy.

In addition, UK spending on global engagement is unbalanced. The British Armed Forces' capabilities have shrunk too much. The UK is surely one of the few nations in history that has willingly abandoned its military might despite its astonishing record, both in deterring and winning wars but more often than not being on the right side in the first place. Outside key niche specialisations such as the Secret Intelligence Service, the Special Forces and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the imbalance in forces is now so severe as to damage the Atlantic Alliance, something that is remarked on by US allies.<sup>32</sup> The UK is jeopardising the most valuable hard power relationship it has and one of the most powerful alliances in modern history. It is staggering to think that Britain could be so wilfully blind to this danger. Rightly, several former foreign secretaries have recently warned that the UK needs to invest in greater military capability.<sup>33</sup>

In terms of British soft power, a House of Lords report from March 2014 rightly identified more that the government could and should do. The government's joint soft power strategy will be a step in the right direction, but all forms of state power, hard and soft, need to be better integrated.

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In short, the UK should evolve its strategic thinking, and work to integrate the tools of state power to use that power effectively. The UK should aim to be the leading “smart power” nation.

The UK has begun to take heed of these challenges. The new “Fusion Doctrine”, an outcome of the Chilcot Inquiry and developed in the 2018 National Security Capability Review, seeks to pull together the economic, security and influence capabilities available to the British state – and importantly civil society – to achieve three national security objectives. These objectives include: protecting the British people; protecting British influence; and protecting British prosperity.<sup>34</sup>

Attempts at integration are clearly taking place. UK officials argue privately that Britain does a better job of it than other major powers, such as Japan, France and Germany. A good example of UK coordination/integration is the Stabilisation Unit, which was born out of the MoD, FCO and DfID in 2004. This is now funded centrally and accounts to a cross-government mechanism. Another example is the Forced Marriages Unit, which is run between the FCO and the Home Office. Although civil servants say that integration works best around a specific theme, these examples nevertheless prove the worth of integration in principle.

We believe that many of the ideas in this document are natural progressions of both the Fusion Doctrine and the desire to integrate the delivery of policy across departments.

## 5. THE STATE OF THE WORLD AND THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

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Whilst conventional wars are in decline,<sup>35</sup> the world is a more challenging and more dangerous place than at the end of the twentieth century. However, this danger should not be overstated. More humans live productive and enriched lives than before. Between 1989/1990 and 2009, according to Freedom House, the number of “Free” countries expanded from 61 to 89,<sup>36</sup> while global GNI per capita more than doubled over the same period, rising from US\$4,550 to over US\$8,978.<sup>37</sup> This more liberal, prosperous world was enabled by freer, if not free trade, the spread of basic human rights, and the development of the post-war, rules-based international system.

Alongside the US, the UK is a founder and custodian of this rules-based system. It is one of the UK’s greatest achievements – from both a strategic and moral perspective. This multilateral order remains critical to both UK and global prosperity. Despite its failings, Jeremy Hunt, the Foreign Secretary, pointed out in late 2018 that: “the international order put together by the US and the UK after the Second World War has been the most successful in human history.”<sup>38</sup>

However, this system is under strain. Democracy, which twenty years ago was the dominant model of global development, now has forceful competition. For the moment, at least, authoritarian states are on the rise. The political values Britons take for granted are becoming a minority in the world. Indeed, within a decade, the world’s most economically powerful nation may be an autocracy. Even allies are flirting with authoritarianism, such as Turkey.<sup>39</sup>

The international system is critical to the stability of the world and to continued efforts to raise living standards for humanity. When alliances and security arrangements fail – such as the League of Nations prior to the Second World War – the international system collapses into one in which raw power predominates. Today, despite the hopes of the 1990s, we are in a global battle for influence between liberal democracies and the neo-authoritarian states whose regimes not only seek to control the information to which their people have access, but also – in some instances – to corrupt Britain’s own.

The battle for the twenty-first century is, in part, between open and closed societies.

A series of generational political conflicts, rivalries and “cold wars” are being played out across the globe. Gavin Williamson, the Secretary of State for Defence, said that the current international climate is marked by “persistent, aggressive, state competition”.<sup>40</sup> General Sir Nicholas Carter, the Chief of the Defence Staff, explained the consequences of states using new forms of tactics in January 2018:


Worrying though, all of these states have become masters at exploiting the seams between peace and war. What constitutes a weapon in this grey area no longer has to go ‘bang’. Energy, cash – as bribes – corrupt business practices, cyber-attacks, assassination, fake news, propaganda and indeed military intimidation are all examples of the weapons used to gain advantage in this era of ‘constant competition’.<sup>41</sup>

As Figure 1 shows, not only are these examples taking place in specific locations, but also, as importantly, they are taking place in the virtual world and in the hearts and minds of hundreds of millions of people. In some senses, the virtual world is now as important as the physical world in the rivalry of states, interests, values and ideas.

These new conflicts are being played out using a variety of tools, including new and complex information operations on social media and in the virtual space, laws, economic levers (gas pipelines, bribes and sanctions) and paramilitary violence. There are up to fifty recognisable tools and methods of modern conflict manipulation.<sup>42</sup> These tools and methods now include

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**Figure 1: Potential Global Flashpoints**



cyber threats to the electoral systems of democracies and the use of Artificial Intelligence and big data to control populations, as well as the design or ulterior use of social media algorithms, advertisements and multimedia to encourage dissent and division.<sup>43</sup> The misuse of Artificial Intelligence represents a risk to human freedom, especially when combined with big data - potentially for example in China's use of its social credit system.

The Kremlin has developed the most advanced form of this new conflict model where the tools of state power - violent and non-violent - are combined into an integrated whole.<sup>44</sup> "Contemporary Russian Conflict" is a sophisticated form of state influence closely linked to political objectives. Russia's belief in the multi-faceted nature of war is reflected in successive iterations of its major security documents: the Military Doctrine, Foreign Policy Concept, and National Security Strategy and the Information Security Doctrine.<sup>45</sup> The 2015 Military Doctrine, for example, identifies the first characteristic of "contemporary military conflict" as the "integrated employment of military force and political, economic, informational or other non-military measures implemented with a wide use of the potential of popular protest and of special force operations".<sup>46</sup> It is not so much a military art, as a new form of a strategic art which combines all the tools of state power in all the domains, physical and non-physical.

China has also developed non-conventional and full-spectrum theories of conflict, as evidenced by the seminal 1999 work *Unrestricted Warfare* by Lt. Col. Qiao Liang and Lt. Col. Wang Xiansui.<sup>47</sup> In the South China Sea, through its construction of fake islands, unlawful claims and the establishment of so-called "straight baselines", China is in breach of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.<sup>48</sup> Against the West, it has been accused of large-scale hacking, including the theft of personal details of over 20 million US Federal employees.<sup>49</sup> Whilst its political influence operations are more subtle than Russia's, they are in some ways more challenging, as Australia and New Zealand, amongst others, are finding out.<sup>50</sup>

More generally, the centre of world trade and power is shifting to countries of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Consequently, Britain's Indo-Pacific allies and partners, such as Japan, Korea and India, as well as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, are becoming more politically and economically important.

## 6. SEEING THE WORLD THROUGH VALUES AND INTERESTS

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If it is to promote the Three Freedoms, the UK needs to understand more effectively the linkage between its values and interests, particularly if it is to challenge the renewed “Realist School” of international relations that sees the world exclusively in terms of raw power projection and spheres of influence. There is a tendency to see foreign policy through the prism of geography or interests, such as defence, aid and trade. This can produce stale and unoriginal thinking. Instead, Britain should view the world through the prism of values and interests. There are nations with whom the UK shares values and interests. There are nations with whom it shares some interests but few values. Finally, there are those with whom it shares few values or interests.

For example, the “Anglosphere” – Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the US – represents a group of nations in which shared values and interests almost completely overlap. These states are defined by popular sovereignty expressed through democratic ballots, a commitment to a common law separate from political power and a multi-party system. The UK shares a language and significant cultural heritage with all four, and a shared head of state with three of them.

As the UK withdraws from the EU, it has the opportunity to deepen its ties with these historical partners, especially in relation to defence, trade and immigration.

Next come most European nations, especially those of the EU. The UK shares many core values with European democracies, although its legal system is different, and its approach to sovereignty is not the same. In EU countries, popular sovereignty is mitigated by assertive and entrenched elites, more so than in Anglosphere states.

The UK also shares many interests and values with other nations of the Commonwealth, and indeed economic growth in the years to come will be driven by nations such as India, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. Whilst this report does not touch on the UK’s relationship with the Commonwealth states in detail, it is fast becoming more important politically and economically. Britain also shares many values and interests with nations which have very different cultures, such as Japan and South Korea, as well as the states of South America such as Brazil, Colombia and Chile.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, there are states with whom Britain shares few values and interests. The most obvious of those is the Russian state (as opposed to the Russian people). Vladimir Putin’s regime seeks to undermine British values and interests. There are many reasons for the breakdown in UK relations with the Kremlin, some perhaps based on misunderstandings and errors on both sides. However, the Russian regime has increasingly attempted to damage British values through the corruption of electoral processes, free speech and UK interests by threatening the rules-based international system and the NATO alliance.<sup>51</sup>

Between these two extremes are those states with whom the UK shares few values but some interests. Perhaps the most important is China. Britain has a very different outlook to the communist, one-party state on the rule of law and freedom of speech, but both countries share interests such as a commitment to global trade. While China seeks to bend and partially subvert the current system, it does not, like Russia, seek to undermine it.

British policy should be clear: with those it shares values, the UK should aim to deepen its ties to as great an extent as possible, particularly but not solely with the so-called Anglosphere. With those with whom it shares interests, the UK should develop those interests whilst being clear about British values. With those with whom the British people share neither values nor interests, the UK should be determined to protect both whilst seeking to establish mutual

interests. In addition, Britain should seek dialogue not only with governments but with their peoples, hence the importance of a re-invigorated BBC World Service as well as British culture more generally, expressed through private individuals or the British Council.

Regarding British values, there is a caveat here: not all states are democracies.<sup>52</sup> If the UK refused to trade with them, it would make itself poorer and more isolated. Britain would also hinder its ability to influence those states or interact with them and their citizens. An “ethical” foreign policy means, where possible, engaging with other countries and seeking to influence them, not denouncing them. The UK should lead by example, rather than lecture. There is a balance, and sometimes Britain gets it wrong, which damages its ability to influence such countries.

## 7. USING STRATEGY TO SUPPORT THE INTEGRATION OF GLOBAL POLICY

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Strategy is about reconciling ends, ways and means.<sup>53</sup> To make the UK better able to achieve its ends, it should marshal its means and ways – its resources and how it uses them – more effectively. Whilst the UK has considerable influence, it has limitations – as does any nation. To pursue the Three Freedoms most effectively, the UK should fully integrate the tools of state power. Whilst Russia and China do *not* have foreign policies that Britain should copy,<sup>54</sup> they show the worth of *integrating* power. They are also aware that the stark dichotomy between “peace” and “war” has blurred as the nature of state conflict has changed. Although major conventional war is thankfully unlikely, the world has moved back into an era of permanent competition and proxy warfare.

The tools of national power and influence exist on a spectrum, ranging from hard power through to soft power. They should not be seen in isolation from one another. It is the integration of these tools which makes them more than the sum of their parts. In a democracy, there are many tools in the field of culture, academia and religion – “civil society” – which the state should not co-opt. These tools are better kept at arm’s length, expressed by individuals as part of “people’s diplomacy”.

British state power is sometimes less than the sum of its parts because overseas engagement has come to be divided between so many competing departments. Arguably, the decision to separate the delivery of “foreign aid” from the FCO and establish DfID as a separate department in the late 1990s was an error. Moreover, the UK has gradually “securitised” its global engagement, becoming increasingly reactive to threats and challenges as and when they emerge.<sup>55</sup> This can be seen in the way that Britain has a National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, but not a National Global Strategy.

Therefore, we believe a National Global Strategy would set out a more active policy. It is better to shape the international environment rather than standing by until others shape it for the UK in accordance with their own values and interests.

How, then, could the components of British power be “desecuritized” and “integrated” more effectively?

We believe that the government should undertake a thorough examination of how the UK and the British state engages with the world. In the meantime, we have developed a number of ideas to build on the Fusion Doctrine.

### 7.1 A National *Strategy* Council

The National *Security* Council is currently the closest institution that attempts to coordinate cross-department global engagement. It was initially established to “coordinate and deliver the government’s national security agenda”.<sup>56</sup> As a result of its national security focus, though, it focuses too much on security and not enough on strategy.<sup>57</sup> Strategy goes beyond security. The Fusion Doctrine has tried to overcome this by establishing sixteen implementation groups to support the National Security Council. However, to drive integration and create a National *Global* Strategy, we propose the National Security Council should be broadened to become a National *Strategy* Council.

The National Strategy Council would undertake two roles:

- First, it would generate the National Global Strategy every decade to provide strategic direction to the UK’s departments of state (by comparison, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” is a US\$1 trillion, multi-decade strategy).<sup>58</sup> The National Global

Strategy would not be a *security* document, but a *strategy* document. It would focus on global engagement – with defence as part of that – but with the aim of driving a strategic vision and coordinating overseas impact. The National Strategy Council would also be responsible for ongoing integration and coordination at senior levels of government.

- Second it would, as it does now, function as a National *Security* Council to combine the departments and agencies of the state involved in security and emergency planning.

This National Strategy Council would be headed by the Prime Minister, with the Foreign Secretary as deputy head and senior representatives from the MoD and other relevant departments advised by a new Global Strategy Advisor, as well as the pre-existing National Security Advisor. We envisage the Global Strategy Advisor answering formally to the Foreign Secretary and on a working basis to the/a deputy foreign minister responsible for driving integration across all departments and agencies of state.

In Whitehall, to support integration, DIT and DfID would gradually be amalgamated into the FCO, becoming new agencies.<sup>59</sup> They would lose their separate departmental budgets, saving millions of pounds in personnel and other costs. The FCO would then be headed by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, flanked by a senior Minister for Trade (possibly a Cabinet role) and a Minister for International Development. Effectively, our departmental structures would mirror those of Australia and Canada, with the MoD remaining a separate ministry.

This also implies the Prime Minister’s office relinquishing some influence and power over the operational management of global policy, whilst the FCO itself would consider how it can coordinate more effectively when working with other departments and agencies.

At the operational level in global policy, we envisage the FCO becoming the lead department to which the strategic leadership of the MoD, DfID and DIT would coordinate integrated plans. The FCO would again become the undisputed intellectual driver of global engagement. The “One HMG” agenda – which aims “to remove barriers to joint working, so that all staff working for the UK government overseas can deliver the UK’s objectives more effectively and efficiently” – should be progressively operationalised to deliver British global policy cross-government.<sup>60</sup>

At the tactical level, as laid out in Box 1, we envisage the establishment of “Joint Effects Teams”.

#### Box 1: Joint Effects Teams

Both at home and abroad, the UK would structure work around – where appropriate – Joint Effects Teams (JETs).

As part of the JETs policy, the FCO would lead UK overseas policy abroad. In practical terms this means that UK Ambassadors and High Commissioners (from whatever department) would have line management of all staff, regardless of department. They would also oversee the implementation of the country strategies agreed between all government stakeholders involved. This should become the institutionalised norm but it does not yet appear to be the case. A 2015 National Audit Office report found examples of both good and bad joint working. Collaboration, it said, was too often dependent on individual personalities.<sup>61</sup> In a large embassy, the implementation of a single country strategy may involve a dozen or more different government departments and agencies including: the Cabinet Office, the MoD, the Home Office, DfID, the

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Police Liaison, the National Crime Agency, , and the British Council.

In almost all posts, this management chain would be via the FCO. In time of conflict (such as during operations in Afghanistan or Iraq), it could be military.

JETs would also result in personnel serving *under a single legal chain*. The single legal chain would prevent “back-watching” in decision making and enable commanders and leaders to make timely decisions whilst knowing they are protected by UK law.<sup>62</sup>

In addition, Whitehall should introduce a common set of terms and conditions for all civil servants and diplomats stationed overseas. Such a system will end the iniquity of diplomats, DfID and DIT officials doing similar jobs for different rates of pay. Harmonisation was agreed in 2007. Since then, the National Audit Office has said that progress has been “very slow”.<sup>63</sup>

In addition, there is a strong case for moving responsibility for the UK Overseas Territories from the FCO and to the Cabinet Office. The Overseas Territories are not “foreign” and their specific issues are best dealt with on a cross-government basis.

## 7.2 Rebalancing spending on global engagement

Britain’s “securitised” and stove-piped power projection has been compounded over the past two decades by growing spending imbalances. For example, defence spending has shrunk as a percentage of national income since 2010, yet spending on “international development” has increased sharply.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, due to a 2015 Act of Parliament, spending on “international development” – defined as “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) (see Box 2) – is the only area of government expenditure that is mandated by law to reach a specific proportion of GNI – 0.7% – per year.<sup>65</sup> The issue here is not necessarily that the UK should reverse this law, but rather that “international development” spending should be made more effective.

The quality of DfID’s spending – as the lead department for the delivery of ODA – has improved significantly in recent years. To its credit, DfID probably spends money more effectively than other government departments. However, there are stories, some accurate, of money spent poorly.<sup>66</sup> This may be partly linked with DfID’s need to hit the lawful spending target, rather than spending effectively. HM Treasury’s “use-it-or-lose-it” spending rules allocate money to projects within financial years, regardless of whether they are fully-developed and/or appraised, or indeed worthwhile – leading to accusations that DfID has been under pressure to “simply shovel money out the door”.<sup>67</sup> In a 2015 report, the National Audit Office found merit in such claims, although a later report found that DfID took subsequent remedial action, even if problems remain.<sup>68</sup>

Sometimes money is ineffectively spent due to UK procedures, both in relation to DfID and HM Treasury. For example, one of the authors met Syrian doctors in the summer of 2018 to discuss their remarkable work running clinics to treat injured Syrians from that country’s brutal civil war.<sup>69</sup> They are funded through DfID’s budget. However, up to 30% of the funding for administration goes through three or four different levels of Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) bureaucracy: national and regional headquarters, country offices and the local office of the implementing partner. Thus, via current structures, a £10 million donation on behalf of the UK taxpayer becomes around £7 million by the time it reaches those who need it.<sup>70</sup>

Therefore, the claim that every penny is accounted for is, at best, a half-truth.

Equally, DfID staffing and administration policy is mandated to be no more than 2.5% of the total operating cost and, since 2009, DfID’s headcount has been reduced to save on administration costs. Reducing such costs is laudable. However, the unforeseen consequence of this rule is that DfID cannot do smaller-scale projects, because they are not considered to be sufficiently

cost-effective. This has led to DfID relying on external contractors, ever-larger programmes and rent-seeking inside the contracting industry. Therefore, this leads to the bizarre logic that DfID can give £100 million, under one project manager, to an international NGO, yet it cannot deliver 100 £1 million projects under 20-50 project managers, even if these deliver much better value for money and much better results, because it would be in breach of its own rules.

DfID is geared towards spending big rather than spending well.

Consequently, to push DfID towards delivering better value-for-money projects that reach those most in need, the department's own rules should be changed to accept that operating costs will rise to allow for more, smaller-scale projects. Counter-intuitively, DfID's headcount should also be increased, if necessary, to enable it to develop these smaller projects which prioritise value-for-money.

Moreover, "international development" is defined as ODA by the 2015 Act of Parliament. The definition of ODA was first given by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1969 (refined in 1972 and 2016) (see Box 2).<sup>71</sup> The problem here is that because ODA is designed to achieve primarily "economic development and welfare [emphasis added]", it is difficult to support other forms of development.<sup>72</sup> Thus, by clinging to this economic definition of "international development", the UK is preventing itself from funding primarily non-economic development programmes within the allotment of 0.7% of GNI, including certain peace-keeping operations, as well as the projection of values, principles and narratives that are essential for the creation of stable, well-governed and prosperous ("developed") societies. Moreover, even if ODA could be adapted to qualify for forms of development other than "economic development and welfare", some forms of assistance would be forbidden under the ODA definition because it may "promote the donor's image".

### Box 2: What is Official Development Assistance (ODA)? (Abridged version)

The DAC defines ODA as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are:

1. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and
2. each transaction of which:
  - a. is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
  - b. is concessional in character.

**Coverage:** Over the years the DAC has continuously refined the detailed ODA reporting rules to ensure fidelity to the definition and the greatest possible consistency among donors. The boundary of ODA has been carefully delineated in many fields, including:

- Military aid: No military equipment or services are reportable as ODA. Anti-terrorism activities are also excluded. However, the cost of using donors' armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is eligible.
- Peacekeeping: Most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded in line with the exclusion of military costs. However, some closely-defined developmentally relevant activities within peacekeeping operations are included.
- Nuclear energy: Reportable as ODA, provided it is for civilian purposes.
- Cultural programmes: Eligible as ODA if they build the cultural capacities of recipient countries, but one-off tours by donor country artists or sportsmen, and activities to promote the donors' image, are excluded.


The reality is that if “international development” is understood more broadly than as it is currently defined (i.e. as ODA), then the UK may already spend more than 0.7% of its GNI:

- Of the £1.182 billion spent from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund in 2017-2018, £627 million is not considered to meet the criteria for ODA.<sup>73</sup> Of this, £345 million was spent on peacekeeping in 2017-2018, of which only £76 million was considered to meet the criteria for ODA. This leaves an additional £269 million.<sup>74</sup>
- Of DfID’s total budget, £33.9 million was spent in 2017-2018 on overseas projects that do not meet the criteria for designation as ODA.<sup>75</sup>
- Of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s total budget, £575 million was spent in 2017-2018 on overseas projects that do not meet the criteria for designation as ODA.<sup>76</sup>
- It is unclear how much the Cabinet Office, FCO and Home Office spend on overseas projects that do not meet the criteria for designation as ODA. These departments either do not keep this information or consider it too expensive to quantify it.<sup>77</sup>
- In addition, of the BBC World Service’s total budget of £339 million in 2017, over £306 million did not meet the criteria for ODA.<sup>78</sup>

Combined, this spending came to £1.541 billion in 2017-2018, or just under 0.08% of UK GNI.<sup>79</sup> Some of this money cannot – under any circumstances – be defined as development assistance. However, the extent to which the rest could be considered as part of the UK’s spending on “international development” is an issue of definition.

Therefore, spending on “international development” (inclusive of ODA) is likely to be nearer 0.8% of GNI.

Finally, there are some home truths that are not fashionable but need to be stated. UK life-saving humanitarian aid is important and has widespread support. However, the claim occasionally heard in political circles that UK aid mitigates the effects of global capitalism or makes up for Britain’s past ills is weak. It does not, and it should not. By far the greatest alleviator of poverty in the world has been global capitalism, backed by Western and UK Foreign Direct Investment, which has raised tens of millions of people out of poverty. China’s introduction of freer markets – albeit without democratic institutions and often at the expense of the environment – has raised well over 850 million people out of extreme poverty. In 1981, 88.32% of China’s population lived in extreme poverty, i.e. on less than US\$1.90 per day; by 2015, this figure had fallen to just 0.73%.<sup>80</sup> Similarly, over the same time span in India and Indonesia, 154 and 103 million people have been raised out of extreme poverty, to the extent that extreme poverty has declined from afflicting 54.8% and 71.44% of the population to 21.23% and 5.82%, respectively.<sup>81</sup> DfID work, whilst important, is modest in comparison to these strides. When even Indian economists are criticising the UK for spending ODA money in their own country, it is self-evidently time for a rethink.<sup>82</sup>

**Graph 1: Percentage of GNI spent on ODA in 2017 by selected countries<sup>83</sup>**

Given existing spending inefficiencies and the geopolitical changes that have occurred since the establishment of DfID as a separate department, the time has come to reconsider how the UK defines “international development” and thus, what is accounted for within the remit of ODA. Britain has already had some success with international redefinition since 2012.<sup>84</sup> As well-governed and prosperous (“developed”) nations require sound political and cultural foundations, we believe that non-economic forms of development are just as important to the security and advancement of less-developed countries. Britain should therefore revisit the definition of aid and how it spends it. In essence, there are three options:

1. Push for further reform to OECD rules to enable the UK (and other DAC countries) to broaden the definition of ODA, to allow more to be spent on non-economic forms of “international development”. This would allow the UK to include more spending on peacekeeping operations and much of the BBC World Service within its allocation of 0.7% of GNI on ODA.
2. Reform the UK’s own spending target, agreeing to spend 0.5% of GNI on ODA, giving the government the freedom to spend the other 0.2% of GNI on non-economic forms of “international development” (as defined by Britain). Even if the UK reduced spending to 0.5% of GNI on ODA, the country would still spend significantly more than the average (0.35% of GNI) of its major allies and partners (see Graph 1), most of which spend *significantly* less than 0.5% of GNI. This option would require a reform to the existing 2015 Act of Parliament.
3. Ditch the OECD definition of ODA and replace it with a UK definition, maintaining spending at 0.7% of GNI – some of which would of course still meet the OECD criteria for ODA. This option would also require a reform to the existing 2015 Act of Parliament.

We support Option One. As the world's third largest overall spender on ODA, Britain is well-placed to push through further change.<sup>85</sup> However, whichever option proves most feasible, the UK should have the freedom to redefine its aid budget in accordance with its own needs. In addition, there are two additional reforms that should be adopted, irrespective of the option selected:

1. "International development" spending (inclusive of ODA) should not exceed 0.7% of GNI per year.
2. Spending DfID money to reach spending targets by a specified date should end. This is no longer ethically or politically sustainable. As the Parliamentary International Development Committee recommended, if any "international development" money is unspent within a budgetary year, it should be put into a "UK Development Fund" for spending as and when projects are fully formulated or to draw from during subsequent years to address emerging needs. An example of this could have been Syria's dramatic humanitarian assistance needs from 2011, or responding to natural disasters (including in wealthier countries or UK overseas territories).<sup>86</sup>

In addition, the UK should establish rules that meet the expectations of the British people, whose taxes provide the budget for "international development":

- A consensus – correctly – has grown in Britain that life-saving aid should be preserved.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, we propose increasing the proportion of the British ODA budget allocated to such assistance, as such spending has unanimous national support. However, somewhat surprisingly, bilateral humanitarian aid accounts for just 16.5% of ODA, with similar amounts for health, governance and multi-sector support.<sup>88</sup> However, poverty alleviation should, in accordance with the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, develop with a broader Humanitarian and Development Framework.<sup>89</sup>
- ODA should only be delivered to countries with advanced military or space programmes if there is a clear strategic purpose for delivery. The issue here is not whether these countries have need, but rather that they are able to judge their own spending priorities. At the very least, such countries should contribute more to the advice the UK offers in technical or expert areas. Private charity work in those countries, which is important and valuable, would clearly not be affected.
- The UK spends over £1.4 billion on economic infrastructure and services, as well as production sectors.<sup>90</sup> We believe that this figure should be reduced and redirected to fund other core strategic aims, such as increasing UK hard power capability. However, the hundreds of millions that the UK continues to spend should be used to leverage private capital. To its credit, DfID is working on this, and working with the City of London in particular so that it becomes the global hub for finance in the developing world. This is another example of where ethical behaviour can support strategic self-interest.<sup>91</sup> We believe that funding should be based on a "triple bottom line" for DfID: positive impact for beneficiaries, strategic interest for the UK and, finally, financial return.

In summary, until DfID is drawn back into the FCO, it should be more closely aligned with the UK's national agenda – promoting the Three Freedoms – rather than "international development" as currently defined (i.e. as ODA).

Meanwhile, given that the international environment has become more dangerous, the budgets of the FCO and MoD – which have declined as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – should be increased. In accordance with the findings of Parliamentary Defence Committee, as well as a previous report by The Henry Jackson Society, spending on both foreign affairs

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and defence should receive a significant uplift over the next five years. Given the rising challenges, the Armed Forces should receive a larger share of national income - between 2.5% and 3% of GDP by 2025.<sup>92</sup> This would provide the MoD with the resources required to pursue the Three Freedoms and protect the UK's values and interests, thereby "normalising" spending on British global engagement back to historical levels.<sup>93</sup>

## 8. A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL BRITAIN

First and foremost, we believe that the proposed National Strategy Council should produce a National Global Strategy.

To help advance the National Global Strategy, we now list some ideas across the spectrum of national power. These are broadly divided into supporting the Three Freedoms – for trade, from oppression, and of thought.

### 8.1 Actions to promote Freedom for Trade

Working alongside like-minded countries, Britain should build on its free trading traditions to become the global champion of a reformed World Trade Organisation (WTO). Of the major powers, the UK is uniquely placed to campaign for change, seeking to find terms acceptable to the US, the EU and China and other major trading nations. This campaign also gives Britain the chance to deepen its international relationships, building up a network of free trading nations through the world. The UK has natural allies in this cause. These include states such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand – with the UK known as CANZUK (see Box 3). Other allies include powerful states like Japan as well as industrialised or industrialising nations, such as South Korea, Brazil, Indonesia, Chile and potential superpowers such as India.

Critically, free trade depends on free and open seas. Working with the US, NATO, CANZUK and other nations as well as multilateral institutions, the UK should seek to play a leading role in Freedom of Navigation policies to uphold the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This implies a strengthened Royal Navy capable of two significant and concurrent roles in both the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. In the Euro-Atlantic it should preserve freedom of navigation in the North Sea and North Atlantic corridor (submarine, anti-submarine capability), as well as the Mediterranean and Black seas, as the leading European NATO nation. In the Indo-Pacific, it should support the US, Canada, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) allies and other partners – such as Japan and South Korea – in upholding security and freedom of trade and delivering humanitarian and disaster relief. In particular, the UK could send additional minesweepers to the Persian Gulf – Operation Kipion – to keep it free of mines. The Royal Navy’s technical ability in this field means that UK minesweepers are a strategic resource.

#### Box 3: Why CANZUK?

Ever since the Imperial Federation League in the late twentieth century, the idea of closer political ties between Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK has waxed and waned.<sup>94</sup> In recent years, particularly since the Britain has begun to withdraw from the EU, the idea of closer relations between the four countries – sharing the same head of state, established connections, the same language and the common law – has grown. It has recently been endorsed by the Canadian Conservative Party.<sup>95</sup>

In the past, distance has been used as an argument in favour of alliances in Europe and against the UK relationship with its CANZUK allies. However, given that technology is overcoming distance in many fields and direct flights from the UK to Australia began in 2018, the distances between the CANZUK countries are becoming increasingly less relevant.

Together the CANZUK nations account for over US\$5.7 trillion in GNI and approximately 10% of the world’s wealth.<sup>96</sup> They all also share close strategic relationships with the US through the “Five Eyes” intelligence community, as well as the ABCANZ Armies, Five Eyes Air Force

Interoperability Council and AUSCANNZUKUS (a programme to promote naval interoperability between the five powers).

This is a natural alliance to be deepened and developed. From there, the UK should reach out to other Commonwealth states such as India, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria.

Given the CANZUK and Five Eyes' shared strategic concerns, not least in relation to the geopolitical revisionism of Russia and China, it makes sense for the UK to seek closer relations between them. All four countries (five, including the US) believe in the importance of the rules-based international system, and broadly share similar perspectives in relation to the Three Freedoms. As it leaves the EU, the UK should develop closer CANZUK relations in travel and visas, trade, and foreign affairs and defence. In particular:

- **Free movement:** Between 62% and 82% of Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and British respondents claim that they would like to see a common travel area instituted between the four countries.<sup>97</sup> Since 1973, there has been a common travel area - known as the Trans-Tasman Agreement - between Australia and New Zealand, which could serve as the model for a wider CANZUK area. The UK should propose the creation of a similar area, extended to all CANZUK states. For example, citizens would still require passports to work in the common area, and they would not be able to claim unemployment (or other) benefits for a five-year period on arrival.
- **Free trade:** Australia and New Zealand have the deepest and broadest free trade agreement in the world. This should be progressively expanded and replicated across all CANZUK nations, potentially evolving to eventually include also the US.
- **Integrated diplomacy:** Given their shared values and interests, the UK should propose the creation of a coordination mechanism to take heed of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand perspectives in relation to its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This could potentially develop into an integrated CANZUK seat within the next 25 years at the UN. CANZUK nations could increase the sharing of diplomatic facilities.
- **Military cooperation and procurement:** Building on existing military arrangements, the CANZUK allies and the US should pursue more military exchange programmes and joint procurement, such as the Type 26 acquisition and the development of next generation radars between the UK (Isle of Wight) and Australia. This cooperation could even be extended to other FPDA allies to provide more value-for-money when procuring common naval platforms and maritime technologies.
- **Joint Indo-Pacific Fleet:** Centred on a Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier, the UK could propose the establishment of a CANZUK Indo-Pacific flotilla or task group, which could evolve into a standing and interoperable "Indo-Pacific Fleet". Australia and Canada could provide the bulk of destroyers, frigates and support vessels, with additional contributions from New Zealand. This fleet would facilitate larger joint exercises with other FPDA allies, as well as South Korea, Japan, India and the US, to deepen allied joint operations and relationships in the Indo-Pacific.
- **Space collaboration:** The UK is well placed to seize the opportunities of the commercial space age. It already produces 40% of all small satellites globally and looks to develop commercial launch systems and a future Global Satellite Navigation System.<sup>98</sup> Building on its existing agreement with Australia, the UK should partner with other CANZUK countries to deepen and broaden its space and space-defence potential.<sup>99</sup>
- **Defence Pact:** Due to the deterioration in global security, the CANZUK allies - along with the US, which already has deep alliances or arrangements in place with each of them - should consider the formation of a mutual defence pact. This could include a mutual defence clause, akin to NATO's Article 5.

## 8.2 Actions to ensure Freedom from Oppression

As one of the founders of the international order and shapers of the modern world, Britain is a custodian of the rules-based system. Supporting this development is one of the UK's greatest achievements. However, despite Britain's role as a defender of multilateralism, it should practise what it preaches. Although intended to confront oppression, the "liberal imperialism" of the 1990s and 2000s, whilst well-intentioned, disregarded the wishes of others. With hindsight, the UK intervened too much without properly considering the costs that would be involved, both material and human. There are lessons here for Britain, as well as other countries.

The current order is exemplified through the United Nations. Despite its many flaws, the UN embodies the Three Freedoms – not least Freedom from Oppression – in its founding charter, the roots of which go back to the Declaration of St. James' Palace in 1941.<sup>100</sup> In many parts of the world, the UN retains credibility, especially amongst smaller and developing nations, which see it as a means to prevent revisionism and uphold the rules-based system.

Using its permanent seat on the Security Council, as well as its wider influence, the UK should champion the importance of UN reform. It should also pursue the Three Freedoms through the UN, by:

- Pursuing its Freedom from Oppression campaign in the UN, which could, in addition to actions against slavery, encompass the Rule of Law and Justice – concepts that many nations naturally associate with the UK.
- Engaging more in UN peacekeeping operations, either by supporting two operations at a time, or by delivering unique or expert capability, such as Counter-Terrorism or a spearhead capability.
- Investing in a new Headquarters for the British Mission in New York City to house UN and Consular staff to ensure they are able to cultivate UK soft power. There is no reason why this new facility could not be shared with other CANZUK allies.

Looking to Europe, while the UK plans to leave the EU, its ability to work with Brussels will remain important. It is right that the FCO is investing more personnel into the EU and European capitals.<sup>101</sup> Although it is leaving the EU, the EU and its member states, most of which are also NATO allies, will remain close partners.

In relation to European defence, the UK kept a standing army in Europe throughout the Cold War, becoming a *de facto continental* power for one of the few periods in its history. Over the past two decades, however, that has been changing as the UK has reduced its European footprint, particularly with the phased withdrawal of British Armed Forces from Germany. The UK will of course continue to underpin the strategic defence of Europe through NATO – it is the leading contributor to the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic states and Poland and a small presence will remain in Germany – but it is re-orienting towards becoming a global, seafaring, trading power, a stance more compatible with Britain's maritime perspective, whilst continuing with alliances old and new to preserve freedom in Europe.

The UK should encourage the largest and wealthiest NATO European allies – Spain, Italy, France and, particularly, Germany – to meet their commitment, made at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, to increase defence spending closer to 2% of their GDP by 2024. European NATO states can and should do more to help deter Russia from revisionist activities, which would enable the UK to focus on more distant, global challenges.

However, the renewed threat from Russia means Britain cannot ignore its closest neighbours. This threat runs through four domains: cyber and information warfare, Russian conventional

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military dominance of Eastern Europe, European-theatre missile dominance, and European-theatre tactical nuclear dominance.<sup>102</sup> Therefore, the UK should continue to invest in:

- A highly deployable British Army, with a larger reserve element and a significant expeditionary capability, to ensure that the UK is able to continue to fight wars far from home, particularly in defence of its exposed NATO allies in the event of a crisis. Deployability is also a form of deterrence.
- A Royal Air Force sufficient to achieve two aims: first, support troops and ships in overseas deployment – effectively a naval and army air arm – and second, a strategic air defence for the UK and NATO.<sup>103</sup> The importance of the ground and naval air support has been underestimated by the Royal Air Force, which has been historically dominated by fighter pilots. This is changing but should change more rapidly to ensure the RAF’s relevance and therefore survival as an independent service. In addition, in keeping with the second objective, the RAF will need new systems to provide protection against new generations of missiles, including new anti-missile systems (including radar) as well as continued investment in cyber.

Finally, the UK should do more to fight oppression in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine (see Box 4).

#### Box 4: The strategic significance of Ukraine

We believe that there is a powerful case for a significantly improved, upgraded integrated approach to Ukraine, as an example of how a joined-up UK global strategy could work.

In the East Slavic world – consisting of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – Ukraine is the only state that resembles a functioning democracy.<sup>104</sup> As such, it is a “front line” nation in the battle between liberal democracy and authoritarianism. It is a country of some 45 million people, with a highly educated population – with high tech industries – which seeks to be part of the democratic world.

Whilst the UK spends money through international institutions, its ODA to Ukraine is small. Total spending for 2018-2019 financial year will be around £35.2 million,<sup>105</sup> an insignificant sum of money in terms of total “international development” expenditure, when Britain has provided over £2.7 billion for humanitarian work in the Syrian crisis since 2012 – equivalent to £386 million per year.<sup>106</sup> While the UK may have a strong humanitarian mission in Syria, its strategic interest there is limited.

Given Ukraine’s strategic significance, it is concerning how little the UK has done since the invasion by Russia in 2014. The purpose of an aid programme to Ukraine would not be primarily humanitarian work, but to develop the economic and political institutions of a democratic state. These would be governance programmes *with a strategic purpose* and hence allowed under our proposed new rules.

The UK should seek to coordinate policy more with Canada, which is heavily invested in Ukraine due to the influence of its Ukrainian diaspora (Canada’s current Foreign Minister is partially of Ukrainian stock), the US and the EU. Within reason, the more the UK supports Ukraine, the more it deters Russian aggression. The more Britain equivocates, the more it encourages the Kremlin to invest in destabilising Ukraine.

### 8.3 Actions to protect and project Freedom of Thought

The UK and its democratic allies are in a global battle with authoritarian states to shape narratives and values around the world. It is a battle that democrats should aim to win rather

than simply participate in. Britain has three instruments it could strengthen to promote Freedom of Thought:

- **The BBC World Service** is a unique platform for UK soft power. It is a remarkable institution – perhaps the most powerful tool of global influence on earth. Whilst it is *not* a voice for the UK government, it is a voice for British values. Every week, the BBC World Service reaches over 376 million people, projected to rise to over 500 million by 2022.<sup>107</sup> It talks to 16 million Egyptians, 13 million Iranians, 12 million Afghans and nine million Pakistanis per week.<sup>108</sup> Arguably, it is the greatest instrument the UK has in support of freedom of thought.

It is extraordinarily short-sighted that successive British governments have underfunded the BBC World Service – its budget was cut by 16% in 2010, just as broadcasters from authoritarian rivals were having money pumped into them.<sup>109</sup> This is particularly egregious given that the slick and better-funded propaganda outlets of the authoritarian, revisionist powers – such as Russia Today (RT), Iran’s PressTV and China’s English language channels – are on the offensive, seeking to influence the citizens of less-developed countries.

Therefore, the BBC World Service should be expanded and provided with up to £1 billion annually to give it the power to compete against authoritarian rivals. It should be given the task of becoming the global broadcaster of integrity, continuing to set a benchmark standard in radio and establishing one in television to counter authoritarian state broadcasters. An extended and uplifted BBC World Service should be axiomatic for any integrated and coherent policy of overseas engagement. This would especially assume an uplift in BBC Russian, Chinese and Persian services.

- **The British Council** is an extraordinarily powerful vehicle for the projection of British culture in the broadest sense of the word, which encompasses not only “high” and “low” cultures – from Shakespeare to the Rolling Stones and Sherlock Holmes to Viz – but also legal, political and scientific cultures.

Unfortunately, like the BBC World Service, the British Council has also declined in scale in recent years, from 196 offices operating in 2013 to 173 in 2018; meanwhile, China has ballooned from 320 Confucius Institutes to 507, while Russia has more than doubled the presence of its Russkiy Mir Foundations from 82 to 171 over the same period.<sup>110</sup> While this says nothing of the quality of projection from those offices, it is more evidence that autocracies are on the march.

As part of the proposed National Global Strategy, the British Council should also receive an uplift in funding. It should be tasked with becoming a model of best practise for global cultural institutions. Whilst the (partial) self-funding model is important to deliver value for money, there are greater priorities than balancing the books.

- **The Marshall and Chevening Scholarship Programmes** give foreign students the opportunity to study in the UK and immerse themselves in Britain’s open, liberal culture. There are 1,650 such Chevening Scholarships per year.<sup>111</sup> These are one-year graduate courses which can be taken at any UK institution. They should be increased in number, and extended to cover undergraduate programmes in exceptional cases, as well as doctoral courses where UK-based dissertations, especially in the field of science and medicine, could produce significant benefits for mankind. The UK should do the same with the Marshall Programme to support more US students here too. There are up to 50 per year currently.<sup>112</sup> Britain needs talented students, and if they study in the UK, they are likely to make it their home.

Finally, global engagement does not start at Dover. As Box 5 shows, the UK's ability to project the Three Freedoms depends on the strengthening of the same freedoms – especially Freedom from Oppression and Freedom of Thought – at home.

### Box 5: Promoting national resiliency at home

To promote and protect Freedom from Oppression in the UK and to align our domestic and foreign policies, the UK should:

- Introduce better trafficking awareness policies in the National Health Service (NHS) and other public institutions. The Global Slavery Index estimates that there are 40.3 million victims of human trafficking, slavery and indentured Labour globally. Of those, 136,000 are in Britain.<sup>113</sup> Given its role as a public service, the NHS is perhaps most aware of the scale of the problem. One in eight NHS healthcare professionals know or suspect they have come in contact with a victim, rising to one in five in maternity services.<sup>114</sup>
- Prevent British soldiers from living in fear due to the potential for the misuse of law in the ethical service of their country. The UK Supreme Court has argued that there is a growing risk of extensive litigation – effectively “lawfare” – before and during conflict, leading to the “judicialisation” of war.<sup>115</sup> New protections are required to prevent the aggressive use of human rights legislation against British forces for political purposes.

On Freedom of Thought at home (and the threat of malign foreign influence) we suggest the UK:

- Develops a significantly greater understanding of the threats posed to free electoral systems by Artificial Intelligence, big data and cyber infiltration. Russia is already attempting to “weaponise” Artificial Intelligence.<sup>116</sup> This is especially important following the 2016 US presidential election and the theft by the Russian GRU intelligence agency of election data.<sup>117</sup> We suggest a UK Commission, perhaps one jointly sponsored with other nations (the US, Ukraine, Canada and Australia) to examine the dangers and opportunities of Artificial Intelligence and big data in both democracies and non-democratic states. The UK is in a strong position to lead the Artificial Intelligence debate, as it has a significant and growing Artificial Intelligence industry.
- Forms a small, permanent multi-agency group whose role would be to understand and expose threatening foreign subversive activities, both domestically and abroad.
- Establishes a Foreign Agents Act, listing the Public Relations agencies, reputation management firms, lobbyists, and others who work as agents for foreign states or their proxies. Both the US and Australia have introduced similar acts – the US in the 1930s and Australia in 2017.<sup>118</sup>
- Grants the Office of Communications greater powers. The Latvian government, for example, regularly highlights the negative content of Russian broadcasters based in London who spew out propaganda to the Baltic nations. Investigations take up to a year. Against the West, RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik churn out a regular diet of anti-Western propaganda. RT and Sputnik should not be banned, but Britain should strengthen fines and rights of reply and ensure that OFCOM investigates broadcasters of knowingly fake or propagandistic news more quickly. A Counter Propaganda Bill is currently going through the US Congress. Britain needs to consider the same. This would mandate a health warning be placed on broadcasters who do not have an independent editorial line.
- Pursues a more aggressive and assertive use of financial and legal powers, including Unexplained Wealth Orders (and use of the Magnitsky Amendment) to make the UK an unwelcoming environment for politicians who have stolen from, rather than served, their people.<sup>119</sup>

- Sets up a Diaspora Global Advisory Council to advise the Foreign Secretary on how to empower diaspora communities in the UK to support and deepen Britain's relationships with nations throughout the world.<sup>120</sup>
- Updates British visa policy to prevent those who might harm Britain's reputation from visiting or migrating.<sup>121</sup> However, the UK should continue to attract students to study (both in universities and private schools), as well as those with advanced qualifications or unique skills. Britain should pursue, and is getting, a standard points-based visa system, albeit with the flexibility for the UK to remain an attractive destination for students and workers.

Whilst these recommendations are domestic, they send critical messages to friends and adversaries globally as to the British values system. The UK should be consistent in what it says and what it does.

However, although a domestic focus on national resiliency is necessary, it is no substitute for concerted and integrated global action. It is better to challenge the forces of protectionism, oppression and prejudice overseas than on the streets of the UK.

## 9. CONCLUSION

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The UK has an extraordinary depth of relationships with so many parts of the world. Britain *is* global, through its history and trade, immigration and emigration, and ideas and intermarriage.

We have argued in this report that:

- Britain's aims should be aligned with ways and means – in other words, the UK should use strategy. To develop strategy more effectively, Britain needs a National Strategy Council to produce a National Global Strategy, looking ten years ahead.
- Overall the UK has a proud history, and one which should inspire it to protect and promote the values of open and free societies. This is the inspiration behind the Three Freedoms: Freedom for Trade, Freedom from Oppression, and Freedom of Thought.
- Integration between the departments of state helps deliver better policies that have a greater impact for Britain. With the Fusion Doctrine, the government is attempting to integrate more and this should be welcomed. However, more can be done. Therefore, DfID and DIT should be amalgamated into the FCO as agencies, following the model used in Australia and Canada.
- Integration at senior levels is not enough. Integration should take place at all levels. Therefore, ambassadors and high commissioners should have line management of all staff, regardless of department, and be responsible for developing integrated plans. Within teams there should be a single legal chain to speed decision-making, to prevent operations moving at the pace of the most risk averse government lawyers.
- There is an imbalance in overseas spending. Hence, the definition of UK funding for “international development” should be changed so that it can be used to support wider development goals as well as the UK's strategic interests. This assumes an uplift in spending for the FCO and the MoD, with the latter receiving an increase to as much as 3% of GDP.
- One of the UK's greatest assets is the BBC World Service. Whilst *not* a tool of government, it is a platform for British values. That is why it should be mandated to become the global broadcast of integrity on *all* major audio and visual platforms. Funding should be earmarked at up to £1 billion per annum.
- The battle for the twenty-first century is, in part, a struggle between open and closed societies. Promoting democracy and liberal values abroad means ensuring their protection at home, which is why new ways to protect freedom, democracy and freedom of thought in the UK are required.
- Finally, Global Britain should reach out to all the nations in the world, especially to the Commonwealth nations of Australia, Canada and New Zealand to form a new CANZUK alliance.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> May, T., 'Britain After Brexit: A Vision of a Global Britain', *CCHQ Press*, 2 October 2016, available at: <http://press.conservatives.com/post/151239411635/prime-minister-britain-after-brexit-a-vision-of>, last visited: 28 January 2019.
- <sup>2</sup> Johnson, B., 'Beyond Brexit: a Global Britain', *Gov.uk*, 2 December 2016, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/beyond-brexit-a-global-britain>, last visited: 28 January 2019.
- <sup>3</sup> For example, see: 'Global Britain', *House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee* (2018), available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmaff/780/780.pdf>, last visited: 28 January 2019, p.5.
- <sup>4</sup> MacDonald, S., Oral evidence in 'FCO budget and capacity, and Annual Report 2017-18', *House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee* (2018), available at: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/fco-budget-and-capacity-and-annual-report-201718/oral/92448.html>, last visited: 9 January 2019.
- <sup>5</sup> Government departments argue that they are developing a more integrated approach through the Fusion Doctrine and, consequently, that the UK is moving towards a national grand strategy – of sorts. Whilst the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review and the 2017 National Security Capability Review do cover economic prosperity, soft power, aid and influence, they remain primarily security-focused documents. It is also true that whilst there are complementary government strategies – the Industrial Strategy (with international elements), the Export Strategy, etc – the UK still lacks an overarching grand strategy.
- <sup>6</sup> 'Foreign Secretary announces 250 new diplomatic roles and ten new sovereign missions overseas', *Gov.uk*, 21 March 2018, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-250-new-diplomatic-roles-and-ten-new-sovereign-missions-overseas>, last visited: 31 January 2019.
- <sup>7</sup> As part of this review, the authors have talked to over two dozen individuals from think tanks, the FCO, the MoD and other departments. We have also examined many foreign national and security strategies, as well as the UK's Global Strategic Trends, UK Defence Doctrine and the National Security Capability Review. We have also read the House of Lords' excellent 2014 "Persuasion and Power in the Modern World", and works by the Henry Jackson Society, the British Foreign Policy Group, Policy Exchange and speeches by the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, Defence, International Development and International Trade. See: 'Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), *Russian Federation* (2015), available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47334>, last visited: 10 January 2019; 'Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii' (Foreign Policy Concept), *Russian Federation: Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (2016), para. 4, available at: [http://www.mid.ru/foreign\\_policy/news/-/asset\\_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248](http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248), last visited: 10 January 2019; 'Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiskoi Federatsii' (National Security Strategies), *Russian Federation* (2017), Article 12, p.4, available at: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6YOAsHD5v.pdf> last visited: 10 January 2019; 'Doktrina Informatsionnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiskoi Federatsii' (Doctrine of Information Security), *Russian Federation* (2016), pp.5-6, available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201612060002?index=1&rangeSize=1>, last visited: 10 January 2019; 'Foreign Policy White Paper', *Australian Government* (2017), available at: <https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper>, last visited: 24 November 2018; 'Global Strategic Trends', 6th ed., *Ministry of Defence* (2018), available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/754732/GST6\\_Web\\_Version\\_v2.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/754732/GST6_Web_Version_v2.pdf), last visited: 28 January 2019; 'UK Joint Defence Doctrine O-01: UK Defence Doctrine', *Ministry of Defence* (2014), available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/389755/20141208-JDP\\_O\\_01\\_Ed\\_5\\_UK\\_Defence\\_Doctrine.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389755/20141208-JDP_O_01_Ed_5_UK_Defence_Doctrine.pdf), last visited: 28 January 2019; 'National Security Capability Review', *HM Government* (2018), available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/705347/6.4391\\_CO\\_National-Security-Review\\_web.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf), last visited: 10 December 2018; 'Persuasion and Power in the Modern World', *House of Lords: Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK's influence* (2014), available at: para. 241-243; Rogers, J., 'Towards "Global Britain": Challenging the New Narratives of National Decline', *The Henry Jackson Society* (2017), available at: <https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/towards-global-britain-challenging-the-new-narratives-of-national-decline/>, last visited: 14 January 2019; Cargill, T., 'The Price of Freedom?', *British Foreign Policy Group* (2018), available at: <http://bfpbg.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/The-Price-of-Freedom.pdf>, last visited: 14 January 2019; Elefteriu, G., 'A Question of Power', *Policy Exchange* (2018), available at: <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Power-Net-Assessment-Gabriel-Elefteriu-Policy-Exchange-November-2018.pdf>, last visited: 14 January 2019; Johnson, B., 'Beyond Brexit: a Global Britain', *Gov.uk*, 2 December 2016; Hunt, J., Speaking at the Bright Blue Christmas Event, London, 17 December 2018; Williamson, G., 'Modernising Defence Programme – Update, 18 December 2019', *Gov.uk*, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/modernising-defence-programme-update>, last visited: 14 January 2019.
- <sup>8</sup> Hunt, J., '34th Fullerton Lecture: Britain's role in a post-Brexit world', *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 2 January 2019, available at: <https://www.iiss.org/events/2019/01/fullerton-lecture-britain-role-post-brexit-world>, last visited: 30 January 2019.
- <sup>9</sup> For Royal Navy assets, see: Hochschild, A., *Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire's Slaves*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005), p. 310. For West African Squadron data, see: 'Chasing Freedom Information Sheet', *Royal Naval Museum*, available at: [https://web.archive.org/web/20070927230848/http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/visit\\_see\\_victory\\_cfexhibition\\_infosheet.htm](https://web.archive.org/web/20070927230848/http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/visit_see_victory_cfexhibition_infosheet.htm), last visited: 29 January 2019.
- <sup>10</sup> Notwithstanding the appalling losses of the people of the Soviet Union, it is worth noting that the Soviet government began the Second World War as an ally of Nazi Germany.
- <sup>11</sup> Rudd, K., Oral Evidence in 'China and the international rules-based system', *House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee* (2018), available at: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/china-and-the-international-rulesbased-system/oral/92532.html>, last visited: 10 December 2018.
- <sup>12</sup> Patten, C., 'Oral evidence: China and the international rules-based system' *House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee* (2019), available at: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/china-and-the-international-rulesbased-system/oral/94798.html>, last visited: 15 January 2019, Q143.
- <sup>13</sup> Orwell, G., *England Your England* (London: Penguin Classics, 2017 [1941]).

- <sup>14</sup> In 2018, Sir Simon McDonald, the Head of the Diplomatic Service, and Sir John Major, a former Prime Minister, both defined the UK either as “medium-sized” or a “middle-sized, middle-ranking” nation. See: Maddox, D., ‘Don’t belittle Britain! Tory MP lays into top mandarin over comments on post-Brexit future’, *Daily Mail*, 5 June 2018, available at: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/969393/Brexit-news-bob-seely-isle-of-wight-conservative-mp-simon-mcdonald-medium-sized-nation>, last visited: 30 December 2018 and Major, J., ‘I have made no false promises on Brexit – I’m free to tell you the truth’, *The Guardian*, 16 October 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/16/false-promises-brexit-john-major>, last visited: 30 December 2018.
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- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p.29.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p.31.
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- <sup>24</sup> Rogers, J., ‘Audit of Geopolitical Capability: An Assessment of Twenty Major Powers’ (2019), p.35.
- <sup>25</sup> IHS Markit, *Jane’s Fighting Ships 2018-2019* (IHS Global Limited, 2018).
- <sup>26</sup> Hope, C., ‘Britain to become “true global player” post-Brexit with military bases in South East Asia and Caribbean, says Defence Secretary’, *Telegraph on Sunday*, 30 December 2018, available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/12/29/britain-become-true-global-player-post-brexit-new-military-bases/>, last visited: 7 January 2019.
- <sup>27</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2018: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp.503-504.
- <sup>28</sup> Rogers, J., ‘Audit of Geopolitical Capability: An Assessment of Twenty Major Powers’ (2019), p.37.
- <sup>29</sup> This comment has also been made in: ‘Delivering Global Britain: FCO Skills’, *House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee* (2018), available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcaff/1254/1254.pdf>, last visited: 10 December 2018, Conclusion para 1, op.23.
- <sup>30</sup> For the purposes of this document, “hard” power is generally seen as coercive power, be it military power or economic sanctions, for example. “Soft” power is generally defined as those powers or values which attract others. There is a complex interplay of the two, as when, for example, information operations/ propaganda is used to incite violence. The intelligent combination of different forms of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power has sometimes been referred to as “smart” power. Smart power implies an integration of the tools of state power to become more than the sum of their parts. For more on these terms, see: Nye, J., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (York: Basic Books, 1990); Nye, J., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Nye, J., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
- <sup>31</sup> Jones, S., ‘Home Office seizes overseas counterterrorism role’, *Financial Times*, 29 March 2016, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/279c262e-f5c9-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132>, last visited: 10 December 2018.
- <sup>32</sup> This fear was expressed by Defence Secretary Mattis in a letter to UK Defence Secretary of State, Gavin Williamson. See: ‘US defence secretary intervenes in UK military budget row’, *The Guardian*, 2 July 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/02/us-defence-secretary-james-mattis-uk-military-spending>, last visited: 9 January 2019.
- <sup>33</sup> See: Payne, S., ‘Where should Britain go post-Brexit? Eight foreign secretaries respond’, *FT Weekend Magazine*, 11 January 2019, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/3d8451c4-13a2-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e>, last visited: 11 January 2019.
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- <sup>36</sup> ‘Freedom in the World: Country Status Distribution, 1973-2018’, *Freedom House*, 2018, available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20Distribution%20FIW1973-2018.xlsx>, last visited: 28 January 2019.
- <sup>37</sup> ‘GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)’, *World Bank*, 2017, available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2017&start=1962>, last visited: 28 January 2019.
- <sup>38</sup> Hunt, J., Speaking at the Bright Blue Christmas Event, London, 17 December 2018.
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- <sup>41</sup> Carter, N., ‘Dynamic Security Threats and the British Army’, *Royal United Services Institute*, 22 January 2018, available at: <https://rusi.org/event/dynamic-security-threats-and-british-army>, last visited: 15 January 2019.
- <sup>42</sup> For reference, see Seely, R., ‘Defining Contemporary Russian Warfare’, *The RUSI Journal*, 162.1 (2017), p.42 and Seely, R. and Alya Shandra, ‘The toolkit for Kremlin’s new warfare’, *The Times*, 2 April 2018, available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-toolkit-for-kremlin-s-new-warfare-6kthqgd7t>, last visited: 16 January 2019.

- <sup>43</sup> “The easiest way to disarm an opponent’s ideological arsenal is to deny them the advantage of accessing their own arsenal, while simultaneously ensuring continuous and unimpeded access to it yourself. This is reminiscent of the aim of contemporary cyber warfare. Both Russia’s direct and/or proxy anti-hegemonic action is to be thought of in this context, with the latter meaning essentially the establishment of, or lending support to, local ‘spoilers’ on the ground. These spoilers can take the form of marginalised radical right and left parties but also corrupt and captured business and political elites, as well as ‘expert’ communities... or ‘useful idiots’... thus helping proxy spoilers exploit local discontents. More aggressive forms of anti-hegemonic offensive include official anti-narratives in Russia’s domestic and international discourses, and covert strategic communication means, such as ‘hybrid trolling’, i.e. the use of online spoilers to generate negative narratives to pollute an adversary’s own hegemonic chain.” Rogers, J. and Andriy Tyushka, “Hacking’ into the West: Russia’s ‘Anti-hegemonic’ drive and the Strategic Narrative Offensive”, *Defence Strategic Communications*, 2 (2017), p.49. For examples, see: ‘What Facebook Did to American Democracy’, *The Atlantic*, 12 October 2017, available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502/>, last visited: 16 January 2019; ‘Russian propaganda may have been shared hundreds of millions of times, new research says’, *The Washington Post*, 5 October 2017, available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/05/russian-propaganda-may-have-been-shared-hundreds-of-millions-of-times-new-research-says/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.bd717a9f9ed8](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/05/russian-propaganda-may-have-been-shared-hundreds-of-millions-of-times-new-research-says/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bd717a9f9ed8), last visited: 16 January 2019; ‘The Agency’, *The New York Times Magazine*, 2 June 2015, available at: [https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0), last visited 16 January 2019.
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- <sup>46</sup> ‘Voennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), *Russian Federation* (2015), Article 15 a), p.7.
- <sup>47</sup> Liang, Q. and Xiansui, W., *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999).
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- <sup>59</sup> As has also been argued by former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and the current head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Tugendhat. See: ‘Boris Johnson calls for UK’s aid department to be closed’, *Financial Times*, 11 January 2019, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/03bb726a-157d-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e>, last visited: 15 January 2019; Tugendhat, T., ‘Tom Tugendhat on Defending the Rules’, *Royal United Services Institute*, 29 May 2018, available at: <https://rusi.org/event/tom-tugendhat-defending-rules>, last visited: 15 January 2019.
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- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8.

- <sup>62</sup> The problems caused by excessive legalese have been documented by: Tugendhat, T. and Croft L., 'The Fog of Law: an introduction to the legal erosion of British fighting power', *Policy Exchange* (2013), available at: <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/the-fog-of-law.pdf>, last visited: 25 November 2018.
- <sup>63</sup> 'One HMG Overseas', *National Audit Office* (2015), p.8.
- <sup>64</sup> According to data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, UK spending on ODA as a percentage of GNI increased by 22.5% from 2010 to 2017, or from 0.57% to 0.7% of GNI. See: 'Net ODA - United Kingdom', *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*, 2017, available at: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>, last visited: 3 February 2019. Meanwhile, according to NATO figures, UK defence spending as a percentage of real GDP fell by 14.5% over the same period, from 2.48% to 2.12% of real GDP. See: 'Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017)', *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* (2017), available at: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2017\\_06/20170629\\_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170629_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf), last visited: 3 January 2019, p.8.
- <sup>65</sup> 'International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015', *HM Stationary Office Ltd* (2015), available at: [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/12/pdfs/ukpga\\_20150012\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/12/pdfs/ukpga_20150012_en.pdf), last visited: 3 February 2019.
- <sup>66</sup> One example includes DfID funding for a "Girl Band" called "Yegna" in Ethiopia, to help promote women's rights. This was due to receive £5.2 million from the British taxpayer between 2015-2018, in addition to the £4 million it received from 2011-2015. After public outrage instigated by a campaign by the British press, DfID cut funding, announcing that "There are more effective ways to invest UK aid". See: "'By Ethiopians, for Ethiopians": girl band Yegna shake off Spice Girls tag, lose UK funding', *The Guardian*, 5 March 2018, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/05/ethiopian-girl-band-yegna-shake-off-spice-girls-tag>, last visited: 28 January 2019.
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- <sup>70</sup> The answer to this problem may be to increase DfID staff to enable the UK to directly fund smaller groups, rather than having to push the money through layers of international non-governmental organisations.
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- <sup>73</sup> 'Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2017/18', *HM Government* (2018), available at: [http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2018-0743/2017\\_18\\_Annual\\_Report\\_Final.pdf](http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2018-0743/2017_18_Annual_Report_Final.pdf), last visited: 17 January 2019, p. 26.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, p.29.
- <sup>75</sup> 'Department for International Development: Overseas Aid: Written question - 202824', *HM Government: Department for International Development* (2018), available at: <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-17/202824/>, last visited: 17 January 2019.
- <sup>76</sup> 'Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy: Overseas Aid: Written question - 202799', *HM Government: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy* (2018), available at: <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-17/202799/>, last visited: 17 January 2019.
- <sup>77</sup> 'Cabinet Office: Overseas Aid: Written question - 202898', *HM Government: Cabinet Office* (2018), available at: <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-17/202898/>, last visited: 17 January 2019; 'Overseas Aid: Written question - 202160', *HM Government: Foreign and Commonwealth Office* (2018), available at: <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-13/202160/>, last visited at: 17 January 2019; 'Home Office: Overseas Aid: Written question - 202798', *HM Government: Home Office* (2018), available at: <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-17/202798/>, last visited: 17 January 2019.
- <sup>78</sup> Of the current £339 million World Service funding (excluding BBC World TV which is commercially funded), £254 million is funded from the BBC licence and £85 million from the FCO. Information received by email to Bob Seely MP from Julia Harris, Public Affairs Manager, World Service Group, on 11 January 2019. For the BBC World Service budget that is considered to meet the criteria for ODA, see: 'Statistics on International Development', *HM Government: Department for International Development* (2018), available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/771136/Statistics-on-International-Development-Final-UK-Aid-Spend-2017-jan-revisions.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771136/Statistics-on-International-Development-Final-UK-Aid-Spend-2017-jan-revisions.pdf), last visited: 15 January 2019, p.12.
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- <sup>82</sup> Abraham, R., Oral evidence in 'Committee explore the UK and India's economic relationship', *House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee*, 20 November 2018, available at: <https://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/14eeef5e-bbd1-4beb-a57f-116c882fde93>, last visited: 9 January 2019.
- <sup>83</sup> 'Net ODA', *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*, 2017, available at: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>, last visited: 11 January 2019.

- <sup>84</sup> From 2012-2016, the UK was at the forefront of international efforts to reform the rules in relation to the use of ODA money on peacekeeping, violent extremism and working with the private sector. See: 'Changes to official aid rules', *Gov.uk*, 19 February 2016, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/changes-to-official-aid-rules>, last visited: 3 February 2019.
- <sup>85</sup> In 2017, data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development shows that the UK spent US\$18.6 billion on ODA, third after the US (US\$34.1 billion) and Germany (US\$24.2 billion). See: 'Net ODA', *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*, 2017.
- <sup>86</sup> We should like to credit John Morgan for talking to us on this point. See also: 'UK aid: allocation of resources', *House of Commons: International Development Committee* (2017), available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmintdev/100/100.pdf>, last visited: 17 January 2019, p.13.
- <sup>87</sup> It was for this reason that Penny Mordaunt, the Secretary of State for International Development, recently managed to get the OECD to alter its definition of ODA to allow for money to be given to "high-income" countries and territories during and after natural disasters, but further reforms could still be achieved. See: 'UK seeks reforms on overseas aid spending', *Financial Times*, 9 October 2018, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/32d53c32-cbab-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956>, last visited: 15 January 2019.
- <sup>88</sup> See: 'Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2017', *Gov.uk*, 2018, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2017>, last visited: 31 January 2019.
- <sup>89</sup> For more on the outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit, please see: 'Commitments to Action', *World Humanitarian Summit*, 9 September 2016, available at: [https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017/Jul/WHS\\_Commitment\\_to\\_Action\\_8September2016.pdf](https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017/Jul/WHS_Commitment_to_Action_8September2016.pdf), last visited: 3 February 2019.
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